The Case for Planning Commission Reform
The current state of affairs blurs the lines between policy-making and policy-enforcing roles
The City of Troy stands out as a distinctive community for several reasons, one of which pertains to its unique system of governance. It is classified as a "Statutory City," meaning that the laws governing the city are derived directly from the Ohio Revised Code. Unlike most cities in this region of Ohio, which possess a City Charter serving as a constitution-like framework for governance, Troy follows the regulations outlined in the Ohio Revised Code.
Irrespective of whether a community has its own charter or relies on the Ohio Revised Code, the presence of a planning commission is vital. These commissions hold authority and responsibilities concerning land usage within their respective communities. They play a crucial role in recommending re-zoning applications and plat layouts to their city councils. Furthermore, they are often called upon to provide valuable insights into significant documents, such as a community's comprehensive plan. In Troy, they assume additional responsibilities in approving alteration applications within the downtown historic district, ranging from exterior paint colors to window signage.
In most charter communities, the planning commission typically consists of 5 to 7 individuals appointed by the City Council. These dedicated individuals offer their time without any compensation and are entrusted with the task of envisioning the future of the community.
However, in statutory communities like Troy, the composition of the planning commission differs slightly. As Troy's governance structure is established by the Ohio Revised Code, Section 713.01 dictates the membership requirements for the city's planning commission. The opening two sentences of this section are as follows:
The legislative authority of each city having a board of park commissioners may establish a city planning commission of seven members, consisting of the mayor, the director of public service, the president of the board of park commissioners, two citizens of the municipal corporation, and two public members who shall serve without compensation and shall be appointed by the mayor for terms of six years each, except that the term of two of the members of the first commission shall be for three years. The legislative authority may, by resolution, change the number of citizen members to an even number of members, not less than four nor more than twelve.
Take note of the required members that compose three of the members of the planning commission in a statutory community: the Mayor, the President of the Board of Park Commissioners, and the Director of Public Service and Safety.
In Troy, it's an intriguing quirk that both the Mayor and the President of the Board of Park Commissioners serve on the Planning Commission. However, this arrangement isn't necessarily problematic. The Mayor's position is an elected one, and by assigning the responsibility of serving on the planning commission to the Mayor, the voters directly elect an individual to that board. Furthermore, including the President of the Park Board is a strategic move, as it promotes coordination between two boards that primarily deal with land use matters, benefiting both the Park Board and the Planning Commission.
Nevertheless, one could argue that having the Director of Public Service and Safety as a voting member of the city's planning board poses significant problems.
The separation of powers is one of the cornerstones of American democracy, and these principles manifest in the form and function of local government. In cities, legislative powers are vested in the city council, while administrative powers traditionally rest with the Mayor, which is typically executed by the Director of Public Service and Safety, serving as the Chief Administrative Officer of the city.
The principle of separation of powers holds great importance. Legislative authorities, composed of multiple individuals, collaborate to establish policies that determine the overall direction of a community, state, or nation. However, it is not within the purview of the legislative authority to determine the execution of those policies and directions; that responsibility lies with the administrative or executive branch of government. The fundamental reason for this dichotomy is quite simple: reaching a consensus on what needs to be done is much easier than agreeing on how to do it. At times, it is more efficient to assign a single person the task of implementation.
To facilitate a coherent discussion, it is necessary to clarify the role of the planning commission. Does it function primarily in an administrative capacity or does it engage in policy-making?
Clearly, in its capacity as the final decision-making authority for downtown alterations and enhancements to private properties, the planning commission assumes a policy-making role. The commission establishes its own standards and enforces them. Even when providing recommendations to the council regarding zoning and land use, it is essentially proposing policies to the council. The planning commission is not merely a rubber stamp for administrative purposes. However, in our community, as with other statutory communities, the city's top administrator sits on the planning commission. This relationship blurs the line between the administrative (policy-enforcing) and legislative (policy-making) roles that certain individuals in local government are required to fulfill.
From a practical perspective, having the city's chief administrator on the planning commission places that individual in an unfair position when it comes to discussing agenda items. Firstly, the chief administrator has greater access to information about matters under deliberation by the planning commission. It is not difficult to imagine a scenario where the chief administrator has had conversations with potential developers or investors before an application is filed with the commission. In fact, we would almost expect our top administrator to play an active role in these situations. However, when one member of the planning commission, by design, possesses more information and insights, it puts the rest of the commission at a significant disadvantage.
Secondly, the staff members who provide insights and analysis to the Planning Commission are directly answerable to the Director of Public Service and Safety. All items brought for deliberation to the Planning Commission have already undergone proper vetting by city staff, with indirect oversight from the Director of Public Service and Safety. While there may be occasional instances where the city staff makes a recommendation to the commission that the Director of Public Service and Safety disagrees with, such instances are infrequent.
So, how can we effectively restructure the Planning Commission to transfer authority and power from appointed bureaucrats to ordinary citizens?
One potential approach is to require the Director of Public Service and Safety to remain on the Planning Commission but serve in an ex-officio capacity. In this capacity, the Director can still provide valuable insights and information during discussions, but they would no longer possess voting rights on agenda items. The inclusion of ex-officio members is not a new or novel idea and is commonly seen in many government and non-profit boards. Even when examining the construction of Section 713.01 of the Ohio Revised Code, it does not explicitly state that the Director of Public Service and Safety must have a vote on the commission; it simply mandates their service.
By eliminating the voting rights of the Director of Public Service and Safety, we can initiate a separation between the roles of policy-making and policy-enforcement within our local government.
Even if it is not time to reform our City's Planning Commission, we are at the stage where we can have productive and mature conversations about much needed reforms that are needed.
What are your thoughts? Feel free to leave them in the comment section!